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APPORTIONMENT OF RoYALTmS ON PARTITION OF
JECT TO AN OIL AND GAs LFAsE.-In the recent ease

PREMISES SUB-

of CampbeZl v.

Lynch, it appeared that certain land, on which there was an oil
and gas lease under which there had been no development, descended to the widow and six children of the deceased owner. By
judicial proceedings the land was partitioned among the widow and
children, the tracts being of unequal size. The partition decree did
not mention the oil and gas lease. Later the lessee drilled wells on
all of the tracts into which the leasehold had been partitioned except one, and produced oil in paying quantities. The complainants
as owners of the undeveloped tract filed a bill in equity claiming a
share of the royalties. The lower court dismissed the bill but on
appeal the Supreme Court of Appeals reversed the decree, holding
the royalties were not included in the partition and should be apportioned among the parties regardless as to where the oil was produced. A dissenting opinion was filed by Ritz, J., in which Miller,
J., concurred.
194 S. E. 739 (W. Va. 1918).
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The decision of the majority of the court is based on the theory
that the right to oil royalties is a distinct entity, "not legally inherent in or annexed to the title to the land, but capable of being
held and enjoyed by the owner of the title"; that the right to such
royalties is rent like the rent reserved in an ordinary lease of land;
therefore such right was not included in the partition. The court
states that if the owner of land subject to an oil and gas lease conveys a part of the land to another there is no more than a presumption that a right to any of the royalties will pass to the grantee and
that this presumption rests merely on "equity and justice" and
may be overcome by showing it is inequitable to make such presumption. It is respectfully submitted that both the reasoning and
the conclusion of the majority opinion are unsound and that it does
not lay down a definite rule of law upon which the public can rely
but necessitates the application of the yard-stick of "equity and
justice" by the court to each individual case as it arises. A definite
rule of law as suggested in the dissenting opinion is preferable.
Admitting for the sake of argument that a right to an oil royalty is to be regarded as rent such as accrues under a lease for use
and occupation of land (though this appears to be unsound 2) the
conclusions of the majority opinion seem contrary to principles
of the law of landlord and tenant which have been unquestioned for
centuries. If the right to the oil royalty is rent, it must be rent service, and therefore by settled law3 incident to the reversion. 4 True,
it may be conveyed separately from the rest of the reversion but
so may a cubic yard of rock or soil. Hence the idea that a right to
rent is an entity, a thing distinct and separate from the reversion,
is unquestionably erroneous. This idea was apparently taken from
the Pennsylvania ease of Wetenget v. Gormley.5 The error in the
reasoning by which the Pennsylvania court in Weten ge v. Gormley reached its remarkable conclusion will be pointed out below.
Since rent service is incident to the reversion, it passes with the
conveyance of the reversion unless expressly excepted.' If the reversion is severed with out mention of the rent then the rent
2See note 10.
1011; UNDERHILL, LANDLORD AND
491-496; TIFFANY, LANDLORD
1100-1103; TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND TNANT, S ed., & 154.
5160 Pa. St. 559, 28 At!. 934 (1894).
GSee collection of cases in 24 Cyc. 1172; see also the text citations in
In West Virginia the point is covered by statute and can hardly be
presumption. See W. VA. CODE, C. 93, § 8.
3TzFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT,

TENANT, 506.

'UNDERELL,

AND TENANT,

LANDLORD AND TENANT,
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is apportioned according to the rental value of the parts into
which the reversion is divided.7 As has been pointed out in
a previous issue of the LAW QUARTERiJY, 5 this rule as to apportionment of rent on severance of the reversion is inapplicable
to oil and gas royalties. It is manifestly impossible to determine the rental value of an undeveloped tract of land for
the
purpose of oil and gas production. The difficulty lies in the fact
that oil and gas royalties are not paid for the use and occupation of the land as rent is under an ordinary lease. Instead they
are the price paid for the severing and carrying away of a part of
the substance of the land-for the doing of a thing which would
be waste if done by a tenant who has the use and occupation of
the land. It is difficult to see how there can be any distinction between an oil and gas royalty and the royalty paid under the ordinary coal lease, particularly in West Virginia, where it is settled
law that the owner of the land owns the oil and gas in place under
the land just as he owns the coal under the land.' Both oil and
gas leases and coal leases are not properly leases but are profits in
the land. They do not have the fundamental characteristics of
leases and do have the fundamental characteristics of profits. 10
7Roberts v. Snell, 1 Man. & G. 577 (1840); Hodkins v. Robson, 1 Ventris, 277
(1875) (dictunm); Babcock r. Scoville, 56 Ill. 461 (1870) (dictum); Leiter V. Pike,
127 Il1. 287, 20 N. E. 2. (1889) ; Daniels v. Richardson, 22 Pick. 565 (1839);
Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597 (1856) ; Gribbie v. Toms, 70 N. J. L. 522, 57 At.
144 (1904), aff'd 71 N. J. L. 338, 59 AtI. 1117 (1905) ; Van Rensselaer v. Jones,
2 Barb. (N. Y.) 643 (1848) ; Van Rensselser v. Gallup, 5 Denio (N. Y.) 454 (1848)
(dictum); Reed -v. Ward, 22 Pa. St. 144 (1853) ; Pingrey v. Watkins, 15 Vt. 478
(1843).
See also TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TExANT, 1064; TAYLOR, LANDLORD AND
TimANT, § 385. In these text citations the statement is made that if the value of
the parts Is not shown the apportionment will be according to area. Of the two cases
cited Linton v. Hart, 25 Pa. St. 193 (1855) does not suggest the point and the
other, Van Rensselaer v. Jones, supra, says that if the question of value Is not
raised by the parties then it will be presumed the value per acre of the parcels is
the same. Hence if the parties do not see fit to raise the question of value it Is
waived.
$See 25 W. VA. L. QUAnT. 79.
'Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S. E. 436 (1894); Wilson v. Youst, 43
W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897) ; Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236
(1905) ; Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 74 W. Va. 107, 81 S. E. 966 (1914);
South Penn Oil Co. %. Haught, 71 W. Va. 720, 78 S. E. 759 (1913).
5
' That oil and gas royalties are not rent but are payment for a part of the substance of the land seems almost axiomatic. The cases of actions for waste by remaindermen against lift tenants are in point. There Is no question that the life
tenant has a right to lease the land and collect the rent but he cannot make an oil
and gas lease. Keon v. Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 599, 23 S. B. 664 (1895) ; Williamson V.
Jones, 43 W. Va. 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897) ; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. D.
78 (1897). Likewise a guardian has no power to lease the ward's land for oil and
gas production but be may sell under order of the court. Ammons v. Ammons, 50
W. Va. 390, 40 S. E. 490 (1901).
It is submitted the decision of the majority of
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The weight of authority is contra to the majority opinion.1 '
Wetengel v. Gormley which was followed and approved by the
court seems to be the only ease which supports the decision. As to
Wetengel v. Gormley the court says:
"No court has been able to lay its finger on any flaw in the
reasoning of the opinion in Wetengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. St.
559, nor to demonstrate inapplicability of the legal principles
under which that court disposed of it."
Let us see whether there are any flaws in the reasoning. The
ease was before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania twice.12 The
same justices decided both cases and the same justice wrote both
opinions, so that we are justified in resorting to the second opinion
for an explanation of the somewhat vague language of the first
opinion. The facts were that a father who owned about six
hundred acres of land on which there was an oil and gas lease. for
a term of fifteen years, died leaving the land by devise in nearly
equal parts to his three sons. The will was silent as to the oil and
gas lease. Producing wells were then drilled on one of the three
tracts and the owners of the other two parcels brought suit claiming a share of the royalties. In the first opinion it was held that
this oil and gas lease was in the nature of a lease for general iillage
and not like a coal lease. The court after using some vague expressions indicating an opinion that rent under a lease for general
tillage is an entirety, purported to decide the case on principle and
concluded the complainants had a right to a proportionate share of
the royalties. The second opinion explains clearly the basis of the
decision. In it the court holds that the right to royalties is personal property and therefore did not pass under the devise of the
land but passed as intestate property. The court then held the
royalties must be apportioned without explaining why the right
to these royalties was not administered as intestate property and
distributed to the next of kin. The reasoning of the Pennsylvania
the court that oil royalties are rent is inconsistent with these cases. Many more
situations might be suggested tending to show that such royalties are not rent.
2l0sborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil A Gas Co. 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122
(1912) ; Fairbanks v. warrum, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983 (1914); Northwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 0. St. 259, 67 N. E. 494 (1903).
Lynch v. Davis, 79 V. Va. 437, 92 S. V. 427 (1917) is distinguishable though it
contains dicta in accord with the principal case. Higgins V. California Petroleum
Co. 109 Cal. 304, 41 Pac. 1087 (1895), is also clearly distinguishable. See 25
W. VA. L. QtUAT. 79.
-160 Pa. St. 559, 28 At. 934 (1894) and 184 Pa. St. 354, 39 AtI. 57 (1898).
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court is clearly unsound. The opinion states that as the lease was
for fifteen years it was personal property as to the lessee, and that
the lessor's right to royalties was a mere chose in action and therefore personal property such as under the Pennsylvania statute,3
would pass to the deceased's personal representatives. This seems
a rather remarkable conclusion. No authority was cited in either
opinion. It is not strange that the Supreme Court of Ohio should
have said:'
"We have several times had occasion to carefully examine
and consider that case [Wetengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. St. 5991
and it has always failed to receive the approval of our judgment, and upon reconsideration here it again fails to convince
us of its soundness. And the reconsideration of the same principles in the same case in Wetengel v. Gormley, 184 Pa. St. 354,
39 Atl. 57, fails to strengthen the original case."
Probably everyone will admit that in partitioning land subject
to an oil and gas lease the royalties ought to be reserved from
partition or otherwise expressly provided for. The same is true in
a case where there is a conveyance or devise of land which is subject to an oil and gas lease. But sometimes the severance is made
without making any provisions as to the lease. In the principal
case it probably was as much due to the neglect of the complainant
as of the defendants. Because the parties have placed themselves
into such a situation, should a court overturn long-settled rules of
law in order to relieve them? The complainants were probably
not without remedy. They had such a large tract of land (82
acres) that they should have been able by suit to compel the lessee
to develop this portion or partially forfeit the lease. Hence the
equity and justice in this particular case is not so clearly with the
complainants. It is true that if the tract were small a hard case
might arise as to one or more of the owners of the reversion, but
hard cases will occasionally arise under any general rule of law.
One can easily imagine many situations where the apparent equity
would be on the other side and in such case presumably the court
would say the "presumption" above mentioned that the royalty
12

The writer has not examined the statutes of Pennsylvania which were in force in
1894 and the years preceding. A careful search of the statutes now in force in that
state has failed to reveal any justification for such a statement in the statutes now
in force. It is doubtful whether the court had any particular statute in mind on
which its decision was based.
UNorthwestern Ohio Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, supra.
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passed on severance of the reversion would not be overthrown.
This rule as to a "presumption" that the royalty passes subject
to be overcome by the "equity and justice" gives no definite rule
of law by which lawyers and the public generally may be guided.
Apparently no one could be reasonably sure of his rights in a particular case until suit was brought and the case was decided by the
court. The merit of the rule suggested by the dissenting opinion
is that it is a definite rule of law which will do substantial justieg
in a great majority of the cases and upon which lawyers and the
public generally can rely. It is submitted that the doctrine of the
dissenting opinion is in accord with legal principles, is in accord
with the weight of authority and is preferable from the standpoint
of general justice and welfare.
-J. W. S.

NO-TERM OIL AND GAS LEAsEs AND THE RULE AGAINST PEWthe recent case of Johnson v. Armstrong' the Su-

PETUITIES.-In

preme Court of Appeals has again decided that a no-term oil and
gas lease does not violate the rule against perpetuities. The only
cases cited by the court in support of its decision on this point in
which any question as to the rule against perpetuities was raised
are Thaw v. Gaffney 2 and Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.3 In Thaw v.
Gaffney it was held that an option in a lessee to renew the lease.
perpetually is not void as being within the rule against perpetuities. This is in accord with the great weight of authority and has
been termed an exception to the rule against perpetuities. A noterm oil and gas lease such as involved in Wilson v. Reserve Gas Co.
and Johnson v. Armstrong gives to the lessee what is in effect an
option to renew perpetually, if we disregard for the present the
question, discussed hereafter, as to whether there is an implied condition that the lessee explore for oil and gas. In so far as this
right to renew the lease perpetually is concerned the above eases are
correct. However, as was pointed out in a recent article in this
periodical,5 a no-term oil and gas lease violates the rule against
perpetuities for another reason which it seems has never been
'94 S. E. 753 (W. Va. 1918).
'75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E. 983 (1914).
378 W. Va. 329, 58 S. E. 1075 (1916).
'See GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPnTDITIEs, 3 ed., 1§230, 230a, 230aa. See also
cases collected In 25 W. VA. L. QUART. 36, note 24.
"Oil and Gas Leases and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 25 W. V4. L. QuART.
36. 37.
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